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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
BECKER, Chief Judge. 
 
This appeal arises under the Federal Arbitration Act 
("FAA"), 9 U.S.C. S 1 et seq. It requires that we consider 
the enforceability of an arbitration clause in a putative 
contract between Sandvik AB, a Swedish manufacturing 
corporation, and Advent International Corporation, which is 
an equity investment firm based in the United States and 
incorporated in Delaware, and its associated investment 
funds for the sale of certain Sandvik subsidiaries to a joint 
venture company to which Advent would contribute capital. 
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When Advent communicated that it did not view itself as 
bound by the agreement, Sandvik filed a suit in Delaware 
state court, and that suit was removed to the District Court 
for the District of Delaware. Though denying that it was 
bound by the contract--Advent contends that the agent 
who signed the agreement on its behalf lacked authority to 
do so and that it had so notified Sandvik--Advent moved to 
compel arbitration under an arbitration clause contained in 
the agreement. Sandvik objected, contending that the 
validity of the arbitration clause depended on the validity of 
the agreement and that that question had to be determined 
by the District Court. The District Court denied the motion 
to compel, reasoning that the existence of the underlying 
contract, and thus the arbitration clause with it, was in 
dispute. 
 
This appeal presents the anomalous situation where a 
party suing on a contract containing an arbitration clause 
resists arbitration, and the defendant, who denies the 
existence of the contract, moves to compel it. Two issues 
are presented. The first question pertains to our 
jurisdiction. Sandvik contends that this interlocutory 
appeal falls outside the FAA's interlocutory appeal 
provisions because the District Court has not reached a 
final conclusion on the validity of the arbitration clause. We 
conclude that this argument is misplaced for three reasons. 
First, the statute's plain language contemplates 
interlocutory appeals from orders of the sort entered by the 
District Court. Second, other parts of the statute evince 
clear Congressional intent that challenges to refusals to 
compel arbitration be promptly reviewed by appellate 
courts. Third, the issue that the District Court must decide 
in determining whether the arbitration clause is valid is 
closely bound with the underlying dispute as to whether an 
overall contract was entered into by the parties. It is 
precisely this sort of appeal that the FAA's interlocutory 
appeal provisions were designed to address. We thus have 
appellate jurisdiction. 
 
The second question is whether the District Court was 
correct in refusing to compel arbitration. Advent argues 
that the arbitration clause is severable from the contested 
agreement under the doctrine announced by the Supreme 
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Court in Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin 
Manufacturing. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967). Advent agrees 
that it is bound by the arbitration clause even though it 
claims never to have bound itself to the underlying 
contract. Sandvik rejoins that cases establish that when a 
party claims not to have even signed a contract, the district 
court must first determine whether a valid arbitration 
agreement was signed. This is a close question, but we 
conclude that Sandvik has the better of the argument. Even 
under the severability doctrine, there may be no arbitration 
if the agreement to arbitrate is nonexistent. Advent's 
concession that the arbitration clause is binding has only a 
limited effect, because Advent denies the legal validity of 
the act that brought the arbitration clause into effect--i.e., 
the signing of the agreement. As a result, Advent's 
recognition of the arbitration clause is essentially an offer 
to be bound, and not a manifestation of an underlying 
binding contract. We will therefore affirm the District 
Court's order denying the motion to compel. 
 
I. 
 
The parties do not dispute the relevant facts as recited in 
the District Court's opinion, which we summarize as 
follows. Plaintiff Sandvik is a Swedish corporation that has 
its primary place of business in Sandviken, Sweden. It 
produces specialty industrial goods. Defendant Advent 
International Corporation is a Delaware corporation 
headquartered in Boston, Massachusetts. It is a private 
equity investment firm with offices around the world. 
Advent is also general partner in a number of limited 
partnerships ("Advent Funds") that perform Advent's 
investment operations. The Advent Funds are also 
defendants in the case. 
 
In early 1998, Sandvik decided to divest itself of three 
subsidiaries, Sandvik Sorting Systems, Inc., CML Handling 
Technology S.p.A., and CML K.K. (collectively, "Sandvik 
Sorting"), and entered into negotiations with Advent. During 
the negotiations, Advent's principal representative was Ralf 
Huep, general manager of Advent GmbH, which is based in 
Germany, and a director of Advent's British affiliate. 
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In September 1998, Advent, through one of its 
investment funds, Global Private Equity III L.P. ("GPE"), 
executed a Letter of Intent outlining proposed terms for the 
acquisition of Sandvik Sorting. The letter provided that 
while Advent conducted its due diligence review of 
Sandvik's records, Sandvik would not entertain bids from 
other prospective purchasers. Later that year, Advent 
proposed a structure for the transaction, suggesting that 
Sandvik maintain a minority stake in Sandvik Sorting by 
investing in the post-acquisition enterprise. To accomplish 
the goal, Advent proposed a new joint venture company 
that would purchase Sandvik Sorting from Sandvik. 
 
On February 16, 1999, a Joint Venture Agreement 
("JVA") was executed. Huep signed on behalf of the Advent 
Funds. He executed the agreement as "an attorney-in-fact 
without power-of-attorney." The agreement bound the 
parties to form International Sorting Systems Holding B.V., 
to contribute capital to the new company, and to direct the 
company to enter into a Share Purchase Agreement that 
would provide for the company's purchase of all of 
Sandvik's interest in Sandvik Sorting. The JVA also 
contained a mandatory arbitration clause, providing that 
"[a]ny dispute arising out of or in connection with this 
Agreement and/or any agreement arising out of this 
Agreement shall, if no amicable settlement can be reached 
through negotiations, be finally settled by arbitration in 
accordance with the rules of the Netherlands Arbitration 
Institute." 
 
On April 30, Advent, in a letter written by Huep, notified 
Sandvik that Advent Funds did not intend to honor the 
JVA. Huep stated that he signed the JVA without proper 
authorization from Advent, and that the agreement was 
therefore not binding.1 Sandvik sued, bringing claims for 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Appellants placed evidence in the record that represents that the 
phrase "attorney-in-fact, without power-of-attorney" is a well-known 
concept in German law (where it is rendered as " Vertreter ohne 
Vertretungsmacht"). They maintain that signing an agreement in such a 
capacity means that the agent has no authority to bind his or her 
principal and that any agreement signed by an agent who is "attorney- 
in-fact, without power-of-attorney" does not become valid until the 
principal ratifies it. 
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breach of contract, fraud, reckless misrepresentation, and 
negligent misrepresentation. The suit, brought in Delaware 
state court, was removed to federal court pursuant to 9 
U.S.C. S 205, which permits removal from state courts 
when the subject matter of the case relates to an 
arbitration agreement under the Convention on the 
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards 
("CREFAA"), to which both Sweden and the United States 
are signatories. See CREFAA, opened for signature June 10, 
1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517 (entered into force by the United 
States, Dec. 29, 1970). Advent Funds then moved to compel 
arbitration under the FAA. The District Court refused, 
reasoning that it lacked authority to enforce the arbitration 
agreement until it determined whether the parties entered 
into a binding agreement. Appellants (collectively hereafter 
referred to as "Advent") filed a timely notice of appeal.2 
There are no questions of fact before us, and our review of 
all legal issues is plenary. 
 
II. 
 
This matter arises under Chapter Two of the FAA, which 
implements the CREFAA. Article II S 3 of the CREFAA 
provides that 
 
       [t]he court of a Contracting State, when seized of an 
       action in a matter in respect to which the parties have 
       made an agreement within the meaning of this article, 
       shall, at the request of one of the parties, refer the 
       parties to arbitration, unless it finds that the said 
       agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of 
       being performed. 
 
Section 206 of the FAA allows district courts to issue orders 
to compel arbitration, see 9 U.S.C. S 206, as does a similar 
provision in Chapter One of the FAA, see id.S 4. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Advent also moved for a stay pending arbitration, which the District 
Court similarly refused to grant. In addition, the District Court also 
denied motions by Advent to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), Fed. 
R. Civ. P. 9(b), and for forum non conveniens grounds. The court also 
deferred ruling on a motion by Huep and Advent GmbH to dismiss for 
lack of personal jurisdiction, pending limited discovery on the issue. 
These additional matters are not before us. 
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As noted above, and considered in greater detail below, 
the District Court concluded that it could not order 
arbitration until it determined the validity of the underlying 
contract. The FAA provides for interlocutory appeals from a 
District Court's refusal to compel arbitration. See 9 U.S.C. 
S 16(a) ("An appeal may be taken from . . . an order . . . 
denying a petition under section 4 of this title to order 
arbitration to proceed, [or] denying an application under 
section 206 of this title to compel arbitration."). Here, the 
District Court entered an order denying Advent's motion to 
compel. On the surface, therefore, this Court appears to 
have jurisdiction under 9 U.S.C. S 16, as Advent contends. 
 
Sandvik submits that jurisdiction is lacking. It reasons 
that, because the District Court stated that it would have 
to make a determination of whether there was an actual 
agreement to arbitrate, refusal to order arbitration was not 
final for purposes of an interlocutory appeal under 9 U.S.C. 
S 16. The FAA, however, does not support Sandvik's 
proffered interpretation. The language of S 16 provides for 
appeals of orders denying arbitration, and it makes no 
distinction between orders denying arbitration and"final 
orders" that accomplish the same end. 
 
Moreover, the statute's structure plainly indicates the 
appealability of the District Court's order. The statute 
provides for a range of appealable orders in arbitration 
matters.3 In addition to providing for the appeal of orders 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. In full, the provision provides: 
 
       (a) An appeal may be taken from-- 
 
       (1) an order-- 
 
        (A) refusing a stay of any action under sectio n 3 of this title, 
 
        (B) denying a petition under section 4 of this  title to order 
       arbitration to proceed, 
 
        (C) denying an application under section 206 o f this title to 
       compel arbitration, 
 
        (D) confirming or denying confirmation of an award or partial 
       award, or 
 
        (E) modifying, correcting, or vacating an awar d; 
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that deny an application to compel arbitration, see id. 
S 16(a)(1)(C), the FAA contains a catch-all provision 
regarding any "final decision with respect to an arbitration 
that is subject to this title," id. S 16(a)(3). This latter 
passage is significant in two respects. One could read this 
provision as applying to situations in which the District 
Court makes a "final" order directing arbitration. But this is 
the same sort of order that Sandvik claims is covered by 
S 16(a)(1). If this is the case, and Sandvik's interpretation of 
S 16(a)(1) is followed, then the provision providing for 
appeals from denials of orders to arbitrate would become 
surplusage in light of the more expansive language in 
S 16(a)(3). The more natural reading would therefore be to 
treat all orders declining to compel arbitration as 
reviewable. 
 
Second, even if one were to read the quoted language as 
applying only to orders that pertain to arbitrations that 
actually occur (and whose commencement are not in 
dispute as here),4 the clause reflects that Congress decided 
to use the word "final" in one part of the statute, but 
declined to do so in the section that declares that orders 
denying motions to compel arbitration are indeed 
appealable. Furthermore, the statute provides a list of 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
       (2) an interlocutory order granting, continuing, o r modifying an 
       injunction against an arbitration that is subject to this title; or 
 
       (3) a final decision with respect to an arbitrat ion that is 
subject to 
       this title. 
 
       (b) Except as otherwise provided in section 1292(b ) of title 28, 
an 
       appeal may not be taken from an interlocutory order-- 
 
       (1) granting a stay of any action under section 3 of this title; 
 
       (2) directing arbitration to proceed under section  4 of this 
title; 
 
       (3) compelling arbitration under section 206 of th is title; or 
 
       (4) refusing to enjoin an arbitration that is subj ect to this 
title. 
 
9 U.S.C. S 16. 
 
4. That is not how this Court interprets the provision. See John Hancock 
Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Olick, 151 F.3d 132, 135-36 (3d Cir. 1998). 
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interlocutory arbitration-related orders that are not 
appealable, see id. S 16(b), which pertains solely to 
situations in which arbitration is ordered and makes no 
mention of factual situations analogous to the current one. 
 
In similar circumstances, our sister circuits have heard 
interlocutory appeals of refusals to order arbitration. See 
Koveleskie v. SBC Capital Markets, Inc., 167 F.3d 361, 363 
(7th Cir. 1999) (holding that, despite the district court's 
declaration of a need for discovery before a decision could 
be reached on the arbitration issue, there was no doubt 
that the requested order was denied, and was thus 
appealable); McLaughlin Gormley King Co. v. Terminix Int'l 
Co., L.P., 105 F.3d 1192, 1193 (8th Cir. 1997) (reviewing a 
district court's refusal to order arbitration prior to discovery 
on issue of arbitrability, declaring "an order that favors 
litigation over arbitration . . . is immediately appealable 
under S 16(a)."). Sandvik's effort to distinguish these cases 
is unpersuasive. It argues that the cited cases concerned 
the question whether an agreement to arbitrate 
encompassed the claims pled in the complaint and not 
whether there was any arbitration agreement at all. The 
important point arising from those cases, however, has 
little to do with determining the nature of the specific 
controversy, but is rather that, even if a district court does 
not feel itself ready to make a definitive decision on whether 
to order arbitration and therefore denies a motion to 
compel, an appeal may be heard of its denial order. 
Sandvik is unable to refute or distinguish this principle 
away. 
 
Sandvik is similarly unable to provide persuasive cases to 
the contrary. It cites Chase v. Sidney Frank Importing Co., 
Inc., 133 F.3d 913, No. 97-1407, 1998 WL 3609 (4th Cir. 
Jan. 8, 1998), an unpublished opinion in which the court 
refused to hear an interlocutory order in a similar case. The 
court concluded that the appeal was not ripe for review 
because the district court had not determined the 
enforceability of the arbitration clause. There, however, the 
party resisting arbitration specifically claimed fraud in the 
inducement of the arbitration clause. As we discuss in 
greater detail below, the Supreme Court has made clear 
that a district court may decide whether such fraud 
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occurred prior to compelling arbitration. See Prima Paint 
Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 403-04 
(1967) ("[I]f the claim is fraud in the inducement of the 
arbitration clause itself--an issue which goes to the 
`making' of the agreement to arbitrate--the federal court 
may proceed to adjudicate it. But the statutory language 
does not permit the federal court to consider claims of 
fraud in the inducement of the contract generally.") 
(footnote omitted). In other words, there was no legal 
question for the court of appeals to consider in that matter 
because the key issue, whether there was fraud in the 
inducement of the arbitration clause, was clearly within the 
district court's purview. We conclude that the applicable 
precedents more persuasively favor Advent's position that 
we have jurisdiction. 
 
Finally, jurisdiction comports with the purposes of the 
FAA. Refusing Advent's appeal could circumvent the FAA's 
clear purpose of enforcing binding arbitration agreements. 
Indeed, the facts of this matter demonstrate the importance 
of reading 9 U.S.C. S 16 to reach Advent's appeal. The 
question whether there was a binding arbitration clause is 
quite possibly inextricably bound with the underlying 
merits of the case--that is, the question whether the parties 
entered into the underlying contract. Both appear to turn 
on the legal effect of Huep's signature on behalf of Advent. 
See supra note 1. Were we to refuse to hear Advent's 
appeal, Advent faces the possibility of enduring a full trial 
on the underlying controversy before it can receive a 
definitive ruling on whether it was legally obligated to 
participate in such a trial in the first instance. For the 
reasons set forth above, we are of the view that the FAA's 
text and the precedents interpreting it militate against such 
a result. 
 
III. 
 
Having satisfied ourselves of our appellate jurisdiction, 
we turn to the merits. This matter is complicated by the 
stances the parties have assumed for purposes of this 
appeal. Both sides take positions that appear at odds with 
their underlying positions in the larger controversy. 
Sandvik claims that there can be no arbitration at this 
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stage despite its legal position that the JVA, which calls for 
arbitration, is binding. Advent claims that there must be 
arbitration despite its underlying position that the JVA is 
invalid. 
 
A. 
 
The FAA establishes a strong federal policy in favor of 
compelling arbitration over litigation. The Act provides that 
if a party petitions to enforce an arbitration agreement, 
"[t]he court shall hear the parties, and upon being satisfied 
that the making of the agreement for arbitration or the 
failure to comply therewith is not in issue, the court shall 
make an order directing the parties to proceed to 
arbitration in accordance with the terms of the agreement." 
9 U.S.C. S 4. The presumption in favor of arbitration carries 
"special force" when international commerce is involved, see 
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 
U.S. 614, 631 (1985), because the United States is also a 
signatory to the Convention on the Recognition and 
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards. The CREFAA 
commits the courts of signatory states to refer parties to 
arbitration when the parties have agreed to arbitrate 
disputes. See CREFAA Art. II. CREFAA is enforced in the 
United States under Chapter Two of the FAA. 
 
These statutory pronouncements and legal precepts do 
not, however, undermine the principle that the "liberal 
federal policy favoring arbitration agreements . . . is at 
bottom a policy guaranteeing the enforcement of private 
contractual arrangements." Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 625 
(citation and quotation omitted). Accordingly, the District 
Court concluded that it had to first determine if there was 
indeed an arrangement to arbitrate, which it viewed itself 
as unable to do without determining whether Huep's 
signature actually bound Advent to the JVA that contained 
the arbitration agreement. The CREFAA similarly provides 
that a court of a signatory state will not refer the parties of 
a dispute to arbitration if it finds that the agreement to 
arbitrate is "null and void, inoperative or incapable of being 
performed." See CREFAA Art. II S 3. 
 
Advent adverts to a similarly established principle in 
arguing that the District Court erred--the notion of 
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severability. It submits that the fact that it disputes the 
very existence of a binding JVA does not automatically 
translate to a disputation of the validity of the JVA's 
arbitration clause. The point of departure for this argument 
is Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Manufacturing Co., 
388 U.S. 395 (1967). In that case, the plaintiff brought an 
action to rescind its contract with the defendant, who 
moved to arbitrate the dispute. See id. at 398-99. The 
Supreme Court upheld the district court's order staying the 
action pending arbitration, ruling that an arbitration clause 
was to be enforced even though a party to the contract 
sued to rescind the contract on the basis of fraud in the 
inducement. 
 
The Court explained that if the arbitration clause itself 
was claimed to be fraudulently induced, the court could 
decide the matter. See id. at 403-04. "We hold, therefore, 
that in passing upon . . . [an] application for a stay while 
the parties arbitrate, a federal court may consider only 
issues relating to the making and performance of the 
agreement to arbitrate." Id. at 404."So, for example, a 
challenge based on fraud in the inducement of the whole 
contract (including the arbitration clause) is for the 
arbitrator, while a challenge based on the lack of mutuality 
of the arbitration clause would be for the court." 
Matterhorn, Inc. v. NCR Corp., 763 F.2d 866, 868 (7th Cir. 
1985) (citation omitted). Importantly, as discussed further 
below, Prima Paint's holding addressed the effect of fraud in 
the inducement claims. It did not grapple with what is to be 
done when a party contends not that the underlying 
contract is merely voidable, but rather that no contract ever 
existed. 
 
This distinction is an important one, for though 
arbitration clauses are severable from their larger 
contracts, the question whether the underlying contract 
contains a valid arbitration clause still precedes all others 
because "arbitration is a matter of contract and a party 
cannot be required to submit to arbitration any dispute 
which he has not agreed so to submit." AT&T Techs., Inc. v. 
Communications Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 648 (1986) 
(quoting Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 
U.S. 574, 582 (1960)). We must therefore consider how this 
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principle interacts with the severability doctrine announced 
by Prima Paint. Neither party disputes that Prima Paint and 
its progeny must be reckoned with notwithstanding that 
Prima Paint did not involve the CREFAA. See  9 U.S.C. S 208 
(providing that Chapter One of the FAA applies to CREFAA 
cases to the extent that it is not in conflict with Chapter 
Two of the FAA and the provisions of the convention). 
 
Par-Knit Mills, Inc. v. Stockbridge Fabrics Co., Ltd., 636 
F.2d 51 (3d Cir. 1980), is the most relevant precedent from 
this Court. There the issue was whether the plaintiff had 
actually entered into an arbitration agreement and whether 
the relevant documents, which contained an arbitration 
clause, were intended as contracts. See id. at 53. We held 
that, before arbitration could be ordered, the district court 
had to be certain that there was an agreement to arbitrate, 
a question that in turn implicated the validity of the 
underlying contract: 
 
       Before a party to a lawsuit can be ordered to arbitrate 
       and thus be deprived of a day in court, there should be 
       an express, unequivocal agreement to that effect. If 
       there is doubt as to whether such an agreement exists, 
       the matter, upon a proper and timely demand, should 
       be submitted to a jury. Only when there is no genuine 
       issue of fact concerning the formation of the agreement 
       should the court decide as a matter of law that the 
       parties did or did not enter into such an agreement. 
 
Id. at 54 (footnote omitted). On the facts of the case, the 
panel concluded that, because the plaintiff denied intending 
to execute a contract and because there was an issue over 
whether the person signing the disputed document had 
authority to execute the contract, a trial on the existence of 
the agreement was necessary before arbitration could 
occur. See id. at 55. 
 
B. 
 
Par-Knit Mills appears to support Sandvik's position that 
the District Court must first determine whether any 
contract was entered into before it can compel arbitration. 
Advent disagrees and urges this Court to draw a distinction 
between two types of cases: those in which the party 
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resisting arbitration is also suing to enforce the entire 
contract, as here, and those in which the party resisting 
arbitration also denies the existence of the whole 
agreement, as was the case in Par-Knit Mills. Advent agrees 
that when the party who resists arbitration also claims that 
there was no overall contract, then the district court must 
first make a ruling on whether a contract existed before it 
may compel arbitration. Advent contends, however, that no 
such finding is necessary when, as here, the party resisting 
arbitration seeks to enforce the same contract that contains 
the arbitration clause. Advent submits that, because the 
agreements to arbitrate are severable from the contracts in 
which they are embedded, and both parties agree that there 
is an agreement to arbitrate, arbitration must be ordered. 
 
We do not find the reading proffered by Advent to be 
persuasive. Rather, we conclude that the doctrine of 
severability presumes an underlying, existent, agreement. 
Such an agreement exists, under the Prima Paint  doctrine, 
even if one of the parties seeks to rescind it on the basis of 
fraud in the inducement. Par-Knit Mills makes clear, 
however, that it does not if no contract ever existed. This 
distinction was drawn in detail by Three Valleys Municipal 
Water District v. E.F. Hutton & Co., Inc., 925 F.2d 1136 (9th 
Cir. 1991), which carries several similarities to the current 
dispute. As here, the plaintiff resisted the arbitration 
sought by the defendant when the underlying issue was 
whether the contract containing the arbitration clause was 
invalid because it had been signed by an unauthorized 
individual. See id. at 1138. Unlike Sandvik, however, the 
plaintiff in Three Valleys was also the party claiming the 
contract's invalidity. For purposes of our analysis, as 
discussed in greater detail below, we conclude that this is 
a distinction with little difference. 
 
In ruling for the plaintiff, the Ninth Circuit accepted that 
the Prima Paint doctrine extends to grounds for contract 
rescission other than fraud in the inducement, such as 
frustration of purpose, duress, unconscionability, and the 
like. See id. at 1140. Nonetheless, the court refused to 
order arbitration before the district court could rule on the 
question whether a valid binding contract had been entered 
into at all. "[W]e read Prima Paint as limited to challenges 
 
                                14 
  
seeking to avoid or rescind a contract--not to challenges 
going to the very existence of a contract that a party claims 
never to have agreed to." Id. The court then made a 
significant legal distinction. "Under this view, Prima Paint 
applies to `voidable' contracts--those `where one party was 
an infant, or where the contract was induced by fraud, 
mistake, or duress, or where breach of a warranty or other 
promise justifies the aggrieved party in putting an end to 
the contract.' " Id. (quoting Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts S 7 cmt. b (1981)); see also In re Pollux Marine 
Agencies, Inc., 455 F. Supp. 211, 219 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). The 
court then went on to cite a number of cases that it deemed 
consistent with its interpretation of the Prima Paint 
doctrine, including this Court's opinion in Par-Knit Mills.5 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. As Three Valleys recited: 
 
       Ample case law supports this holding. See, e.g. , Camping Constr. 
Co. 
       v. District Council of Iron Workers, Local 378, 915 F.2d 1333, 1340 
       (9th Cir.1990) ("The court must determine whether a contract ever 
       existed; unless that issue is decided in favor of the party seeking 
       arbitration, there is no basis for submitting any question to an 
       arbitrator."); National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Boston & Maine 
Corp., 
       850 F.2d 756, 761 (D.C.Cir.1988) ("if there was never an agreement 
       to arbitrate, there is no authority to require a party to submit to 
       arbitration"); I.S. Joseph Co.[Inc., v. Mich. Sugar Co], 803 F.2d 
[396,] 
       400 [(8th Cir. 1986] ("the enforceability of an arbitration clause 
is a 
       question for the court when one party denies the existence of a 
       contract with the other"); Cancanon v. Smith Barney, Harris, Upham 
       & Co., 805 F.2d 998 (11th Cir.1986) (defense of fraud in the factum 
       is not arbitrable). In fact, there are at least four cases, under 
the 
       Federal Arbitration Act, where a court has held that the question 
of 
       whether a particular individual has authority to bind a party must 
       be determined by the court, not by an arbitrator.  See Par-Knit 
Mills, 
       Inc. v. Stockbridge Fabrics Co., 636 F.2d 51 (3d Cir.1980); N & D 
       Fashions, Inc. v. DHJ Indus., Inc., 548 F.2d 722 (8th Cir.1976); 
       Smith Wilson Co. v. Trading & Dev. Establishment, 744 F.Supp. 14 
       (D.D.C.1990); Ferreri v. First Options, Inc., 623 F.Supp. 427 
       (E.D.Pa.1985). 
 
Id. at 1141; see also Chastain v. Robinson-Humphrey Co., Inc., 957 F.2d 
851, 855 (11th Cir. 1992) ("Prima Paint has never been extended to 
require arbitrators to adjudicate a party's contention, supported by 
substantial evidence, that a contract never existed at all." (citing Three 
Valleys)). 
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We find this analysis persuasive. Because under both the 
CREFAA and the FAA a court must decide whether an 
agreement to arbitrate exists before it may order 
arbitration, the District Court was correct in determining 
that it must decide whether Huep's signature bound Advent 
before it could order arbitration. This is a necessary 
prerequisite to the court's fulfilling its role of determining 
whether the dispute is one for an arbitrator to decide under 
the terms of the arbitration agreement. See AT&T Techs. v. 
Communications Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 651 (1986). 
Mindful of the doctrine announced in Prima Paint , which 
did not consider a situation in which the existence of the 
underlying contract was at issue, we draw a distinction 
between contracts that are asserted to be "void" or non- 
existent, as is contended here, and those that are merely 
"voidable," as was the contract at issue in Prima Paint, for 
purposes of evaluating whether the making of an 
arbitration agreement is in dispute.6 
 
C. 
 
Allowing the District Court to pass on the question 
whether the arbitration agreement is valid when the party 
asserting the right to arbitrate denies the broader 
agreement comports with contract law principles. As 
discussed above, arbitration is a matter of contract, and no 
arbitration may be compelled in the absence of an 
agreement to arbitrate. See AT&T Techs., Inc. , 475 U.S. at 
648. Advent has agreed that it is bound to arbitrate, but 
the validity of such an agreement cannot arise out of a 
broader contract if no broader contract ever existed. This is, 
however, precisely Advent's position. Because Advent 
submits that there is no underlying agreement, if 
arbitration is to be compelled, one has to look elsewhere for 
a binding agreement between the parties to go to 
arbitration. Cf. Par-Knit Mills, 636 F.2d at 55 ("An 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. Advent does make the argument that the JVA should be viewed as 
"voidable" because Advent possessed the power to avoid the agreement 
through refusal to ratify. But this is a merits argument regarding the 
fundamental issue of whether the parties formed a binding arbitration 
agreement. 
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unequivocal denial that the agreement had been made, 
accompanied by supporting affidavits . . . in most cases 
should be sufficient to require a jury determination on 
whether there had in fact been a meeting of the minds.") 
(quotation and citation omitted). 
 
Advent contends that, because it does not challenge the 
arbitration clause, we need look no further for an 
agreement to arbitrate. It contends that the arbitration 
clause can be separated from the main agreement under 
the Prima Paint doctrine. But Advent's fundamental 
position, that Huep lacked the authority to bind the 
company, is at odds with this claim. The validity of the 
arbitration clause as a contract, which the District Court 
must determine prior to ordering arbitration, derives from 
Huep's authority to bind Advent. Therefore, there does not 
appear to be any independent source of the validity of the 
arbitration clause once the underlying contract is taken off 
the table. If Huep's signature is not binding, there is no 
arbitration clause. 
 
To be sure, Advent argues strenuously that the District 
Court could not consider the narrow form of this issue-- 
that is, did Huep bind Advent to the arbitration clause in 
isolation from the JVA as a whole--because Advent did not 
contest arbitrability. The FAA speaks, however, of the 
court's need to be satisfied that there is no issue of whether 
the arbitration agreement was made. See 9 U.S.C. S 4. 
Moreover, the issue is contested. By claiming that Huep's 
signature, which was to the JVA as a whole and not a 
specific clause, is non-binding, Advent is the one that has 
placed the existence of the arbitration clause in dispute. 
 
To hold otherwise would be to assume the existence of a 
contract without consideration. If Advent did not bind itself 
to the JVA through Huep's signature, as it contends, when 
did it promise to go to arbitration? What is its consideration 
for Sandvik's promise to do the same? Advent has not 
directed us to any place outside of the JVA for answers. 
This observation is not at odds with the Prima Paint 
severability doctrine. There is no doubt that agreements to 
arbitrate can be deemed to be valid contracts severable 
from a larger contract if these agreements are recognized as 
meeting the conditions of contract formation. See Sauer- 
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Getriebe KG v. White Hydraulics, 715 F.2d 348, 350 (7th 
Cir. 1983) ("The agreement to arbitrate and the agreement 
to buy and sell . . . are separate. [Plaintiff 's] promise to 
arbitrate was given in exchange for [defendant's] promise to 
arbitrate and each promise was sufficient consideration for 
the other."). It is also true that when arbitration clauses are 
embedded within a larger contract, there is no need to 
search for mutuality in the arbitration clause specifically if 
there is consideration beyond the promise to arbitrate. See 
Harris v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 183 F.3d 173, 180-81 (3d 
Cir. 1999). But Advent claims to have never elected to be 
bound by the document that memorializes the agreement to 
arbitrate. Moreover, it denies that the act evincing a 
promise to be bound, Huep's signature, was legally binding. 
But it is Huep's signature that would have bound Advent to 
the arbitration clause. In short, Advent seeks not to sever 
the arbitration clause but rather to make the acts of its 
agent simultaneously binding and non-binding. 
 
In effect, therefore, Advent seeks to concede a 
consequence of Sandvik's fundamental position in the 
controversy without accepting the bitter with the sweet. A 
hypothetical illustrates the problematic nature of Advent's 
position. Suppose A sues B to perform a sales contract that 
covers multiple anticipated transactions between the 
parties, and B defends on the grounds that it never signed 
the agreement. Suppose further that one particular sale in 
the agreement, when considered in isolation from all the 
other transactions covered by the contract, is very favorable 
to B. Barring some independent manifestation of assent 
from the parties, no court would allow B to assert that it 
never signed the contract while requesting enforcement of 
the one favorable sale. In a sense, however, that is what 
Advent would have the District Court do in this matter. Cf. 
In re Pollux Marine Agencies, Inc., 455 F. Supp. 211, 219 
(S.D.N.Y. 1978). 
 
Because the legal status of the arbitration clause is 
unresolved, Advent's desire to arbitrate, separate from the 
contract, appears as a desire, floating in the legal ether 
untethered by either reciprocal promises or other sufficient 
consideration. Only a ruling on the effect of Huep's 
signature can ground Advent's wishes in the firmament. 
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Otherwise, Advent's desire to go to arbitration is little more 
than an offer to resolve the underlying dispute in a forum 
other than the District Court. For there to be a binding 
contract, it is not enough that Advent and Sandvik each 
agree at independent points in time that arbitration would 
occur; there must be a contract to do so. It is not enough 
to ask that the District Court "assume" that such an 
agreement exists; the language of the FAA affirmatively 
requires the court to be "satisfied" that the arbitration 
agreement's existence is not at issue. See 9 U.S.C. S 4. 
 
In contrast, Sandvik's fundamental position is not 
similarly at war with itself. Sandvik maintains that the 
underlying contract is valid, but asserts that the validity of 
the arbitration clause must first be found by the District 
Court before the matter can be referred to the arbitrators. 
This argument does not require Sandvik to make any 
evidentiary proffers that are opposed to its underlying 
position in the controversy. As stated above, the FAA 
requires the District Court to affirmatively conclude that an 
agreement to arbitrate exists. Therefore, Sandvik need not 
deny the arbitration clause; rather, Advent's denial of the 
underlying agreement and its failure to demonstrate how 
the arbitration agreement exists if Huep lacked authority to 
bind Advent places the clause's validity in dispute. 
 
D. 
 
This Court's jurisprudence supports distinguishing 
between void and voidable contracts.7 First, as discussed 
above, this distinction reconciles our ruling in Par-Knit 
Mills, which impliedly makes the void/voidable distinction, 
with the Prima Paint severability doctrine. Second, we have 
recognized the distinction between contracts that are 
voidable due to fraud in the inducement, the claim at play 
in Prima Paint, and those that are simply void. We 
explained in another context: 
 
       As stated by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 
       the distinction between fraud in the inducement and 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. Of course a "void" contract is no contract at all. See Restatement 
(Second) of Contracts S 7 cmt. a (1981). 
 
                                19 
  
       fraud in the execution is that, "[t]he former induces a 
       party to assent to something he otherwise would not 
       have; the latter induces a party to believe the nature of 
       his act is something entirely different than it actually 
       is." [Southwest Adm'rs, Inc. v.] Rozay's Transfer, 791 
       F.2d [769,] 774 [(9th Cir. 1986)] (citing 12 Walter H.E. 
       Jaeger, Williston on Contracts S 1488, at 332 (3d ed. 
       1970)). The court went on to explain that, " `[f]raud in 
       the execution' arises when a party executes an 
       agreement `with neither knowledge nor reasonable 
       opportunity to obtain knowledge of its character or its 
       essential terms.' ... Fraud in the execution results in 
       the agreement being void ab initio, whereas fraud in 
       the inducement makes the transaction merely 
       voidable." Id. (quoting U.C.C. S 3-305(2)(c)) (other 
       citations omitted). 
 
Connors v. Fawn Mining Corp., 30 F.3d 483, 490 (3d Cir. 
1994); see also Associated Hardware Supply Co. v. Big 
Wheel Distrib. Co., 355 F.2d 114, 120 (3d Cir. 1966) ("[T]he 
fraud alleged here is fraud in the inducement. It does not 
render the transaction void, but only voidable. 
Traditionally, a person so defrauded has recourse against 
the fraudulent party through either of two courses of 
action. He may rescind the transaction--tendering back 
what he has received and suing for what he has parted with 
--or he may affirm the transaction and maintain an action 
in deceit.") (citation omitted).8 Nothing in Prima Paint is to 
the contrary.9 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. The distinction between fraud in the inducement and fraud in the 
factum or execution of the contract has been discussed in the arbitration 
context in other courts of appeals. Compare Concanon v. Smith Barney, 
Harris, Upham & Co., 805 F.2d 998, 999-1000 (11th Cir. 1986) (per 
curiam) (no arbitration when fraud in the execution of the contract is 
alleged), with C.B.S. Employees Fed. Credit Union v. Donaldson, Lufkin & 
Jenrette Sec. Corp., 912 F.2d 1563, 1567 (6th Cir. 1990) (rejecting fraud 
in factum/inducement distinction). Here, of course, the relevant 
allegation is not about fraud, but rather about never having entered into 
any contract whatsoever. 
 
9. The dissenting opinion in Prima Paint does imply that the majority in 
that case rejected the void/voidable distinction."The Court here holds 
that the United States Arbitration Act . . . compels a party to a contract 
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Our holding also comports with the text of the CREFAA, 
which, as discussed above, allows a court of a signatory 
nation to refrain from referring parties to arbitration if it 
finds that the agreement to arbitrate is "null and void, 
inoperative or incapable of being performed." CREFAA Art. 
II S 3. 
 
E. 
 
We also do not find persuasive Advent's proffered 
alternative rule that would draw a distinction between 
cases in which the party resisting arbitration is suing to 
enforce the underlying agreement and those in which it 
denies the entire agreement.10 Advent relies largely on 
Teledyne, Inc. v. Kone Corp., 892 F.2d 1404 (9th Cir. 1990). 
In that case two parties to a distributorship agreement, 
Teledyne and Kone, signed a negotiated document clearly 
labeled "DRAFT (to be finalized by KONE legal department)," 
which contained an arbitration clause. After a breakdown 
in relations ensued, Teledyne sued. Teledyne brought 
several claims, among them the contention that Kone had 
denied that the signed draft was an enforceable contract. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
containing a written arbitration provision to carry out his `arbitration 
agreement' even though a court might, after a fair trial, hold the entire 
contract--including the arbitration agreement-- void because of fraud in 
the inducement." Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 407 (Black, J., dissenting) 
(emphasis added). In our view, this dissent offers no persuasive reasons 
for abandoning the view we have taken. First, of course, the statement 
is in a dissent, while the case's holding dealt strictly with fraud in the 
inducement of the larger contract and made no broader pronouncements 
regarding "void" agreements. Second, the wording of the quoted passage 
indicates that though the Prima Paint dissent employed the term "void," 
it actually meant "voidable" in the sense used by the Restatement and 
our precedent quoted above, as fraud in the inducement is a grounds for 
voiding a previously valid contract and not forfinding that no contract 
had ever been made. 
 
10. Advent concedes some exceptions to its rule, such as when the 
contract in issue was never signed. See Appellant's Reply Br. at 6 n.4. 
Advent does not explain, however, what distinguishes unsigned contracts 
from contracts signed by agents who lack the authority to bind their 
principals. 
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The district court dismissed the complaint because of the 
draft agreement's arbitration clause. See id.  at 1406. On 
appeal, Teledyne argued, much as Sandvik does here, that 
Kone could not enforce the arbitration provision when it 
denied the existence of the entire contract in which it 
resides. The court rejected the claim based on the same 
severability grounds that Advent urges upon us."Kone has 
argued that the 1986 Draft was never finalized. It has 
attacked the contract as a whole without making an 
`independent challenge' to the arbitration provision. It has 
thus not waived its right to have an arbitrator  determine 
whether the 1986 Draft was finalized." Id.  at 1410. 
 
The Teledyne court expressed the view that the position 
maintained by Sandvik in the current dispute raises the 
potential for absurd results. It reasoned that if a district 
court were to find the underlying contract valid, it would 
then find the arbitration clause valid, which would mean 
that the matter would not belong in federal court at all. See 
id. We conclude that this characterization is too facile. 
There is no "absurdity" in allowing the district court to rule 
on the threshold question whether the arbitration clause is 
binding when one of the parties has implicitly denied it ever 
consented to arbitrate, even if the answer bears on the 
question whether the larger contract existed. If the court 
declares that such a contract existed or otherwisefinds 
that the arbitration clause is binding, arbitration would 
then be ordered on all issues arising within the scope of the 
arbitration clause, and the District Court would not grant 
Sandvik any further relief. It is true that the arbitrators in 
such a case could possibly be placed in a position of 
arbitrating a dispute in which an American court has 
already implicitly declared one party to be incorrect.11 The 
issues that arise from such a circumstance are not, 
however, before this Court. In any event, the District Court 
would neither be granting Sandvik relief nor ruling whether 
Advent breached a contract, but rather making a narrow 
legal ruling on the existence and scope of an agreement to 
arbitrate. It may be true that this ruling implicates the legal 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. Of course there would not be any prejudice to Advent's ability to 
assert to the arbitrators its right to avoid the contract under defenses 
such as fraud in the inducement or the like. 
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effect of Huep's signature, and that this is a prerequisite to 
Sandvik's obtaining concrete relief on the larger contract. 
Given the scope of such a ruling, however, it is not a 
sufficient condition for Sandvik to prevail on its contract 
claims. 
 
Insofar as Sandvik's position leads to an "absurdity," it is 
no greater than the one urged by Advent, for there is also 
something odd about referring this matter to arbitrators 
without a definitive conclusion on the issue whether an 
agreement to arbitrate actually existed. Were we to order 
the District Court to compel arbitration and were the 
arbitrators ultimately to decide that Huep's signature did 
not bind Advent, they will have effectively decided that they 
had no authority to arbitrate the dispute. Such a ruling 
would, however, allow the arbitrators to determine their 
own jurisdiction, something that is not permitted in the 
federal jurisprudence of arbitration, for the question 
whether a dispute is to be arbitrated belongs to the courts 
unless the parties agree otherwise. See First Options of 
Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944 (1995) ("Courts 
should not assume that the parties agreed to arbitrate 
arbitrability unless there is clea[r] and unmistakabl[e] 
evidence that they did so.") (citation and quotation omitted, 
alteration in the original); AT&T Techs., Inc. v. 
Communications Workers, 475 U.S. 643, 651 (1986) ("It was 
for the court, not the arbitrator, to decide in thefirst 
instance whether the dispute was to be resolved through 
arbitration."). Such an approach would impair the District 
Court's ability to determine whether the dispute that is 
urged for arbitration falls within the scope of the contract's 
arbitration clause. 
 
Finally we note that our ruling does not preclude 
contracting parties from taking steps to ensure that 
disputes of the nature before us today are arbitrated. In 
this matter, one of the Advent Funds and Sandvik entered 
into a pre-contractual Letter of Intent that provided that 
Sandvik would refrain from entertaining bids from other 
prospective purchasers while Advent conducted due 
diligence review of Sandvik's records. This agreement did 
not contemplate arbitration in the event that a dispute 
arose over whether the final sales agreement was actually 
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consummated, but we see no reason why parties may not 
elect to bind themselves to such agreements. Our ruling 
today does not foreclose future negotiating parties from 
electing to enter pre-agreements to arbitrate disputes 
arising out of efforts to negotiate future contracts. Cf. 
Virginia Carolina Tools v. Int'l Tool Supply, Inc. , 984 F.2d 
113, 117 (4th Cir. 1993) ("[P]arties may of course provide by 
contract for arbitration even of arbitrability issues.") (citing 
AT&T Techs., 475 U.S. at 649). We hold only that when the 
very existence of such an agreement is disputed, a district 
court is correct to refuse to compel arbitration until it 
resolves the threshold question of whether the arbitration 
agreement exists. 
 
The order of the District Court denying the motion to 
compel arbitration will be affirmed. 
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